Previous research has suggested that party labels operate like brand names that citizens use to inform their votes. The article argues that this earlier work has focused too much on the content of party messages, while the informational value of party labels also depends on voter uncertainty about the party's behavior in office. These intuitions are developed in a Bayesian learning model in which voters update their beliefs about the mean and variance in the distribution of parties' ideologies, and apply these beliefs to a spatial model of partisan choice with risk-averse voters. The model predicts that if party unity is high, then party labels will provide a useful signal to voters about candidate characteristics and identifications with the parties will be strong, but if party unity is low, then party attachments will be weak. This approach seems to explain both the stability in respondents' political preferences over the life-cycle and the decline and resurgence in the strength of party identifications in the American electorate over the last half-century.
Introduction
The growing competitiveness of two-party competition in the United States has brought about a new ritual: every two years just after the final polls close on the West coast on Election Day, embarrassed leaders from the losing party wring their hands and begin to talk about the need to transform their party's image. Generally speaking, the leaders splinter into two camps. One group argues its party has moved too far toward the ideological extremes, neglecting moderate segments of the electorate. Conversely, the other side argues that its party has become too centrist, which gives its base little incentive to turn out. While disagreeing about the particular message to be delivered, both sides will agree on one point: that greater efforts are needed to invest in broadcasting the party's message to the general public.
This renewed emphasis on party images comes at a time during which political scientists, while no longer debating the 'decline of party' (e.g., Bartels, 2000; Hetherington, 2001) continue to characterize American campaigns and elections as candidate centered. The individual candidate is responsible for the operation of his or her own campaign -an organizational form demanded by the United States' campaign finance laws -and is expected to campaign in no small measure on the basis of personal appeal (e.g., Schlesinger, 1994; Wattenberg, 1996) . But, if campaigns and elections are candidate centered, then why are politicians increasingly concerned about public perception of party as opposed to perceptions of individuals within the party?
A frequently given explanation for the concern about parties' reputations is that shared party labels benefit the electoral fortunes of candidates, much like the way that brand names improve the sales of some products. The logic, best elaborated among students of legislative politics, is that voters lack the ability and interest to take the measure of candidates on a wide assortment of relevant attributes. As a result, the public relies on partisan cues as decisionmaking shortcuts to differentiate between candidates at the ballot box (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Aldrich, 1995; Snyder and Ting, 2002) . A party's success or failure come Election Day is therefore seen as determined in no small part on the organization's presentation of self. Thus, in explaining the Democratic Party's failure to win the 2004 presidential election despite an increasingly unpopular war and laggard economic performance, former President Clinton argued in a speech to the Democratic National Committee in 2005 that 'we need to brand ourselves better. There were too many people who didn't know we were Democrats except that we were against Bush's policies'.
Despite the widespread use of the brand metaphor, little attention has been given to its value for understanding the behavior of the general public. Specifically, for the metaphor to help us to make sense of Americans' political behavior and party strategy, it would seem that two conditions would have to be satisfied. First, the public must prefer candidates who belong to parties whose images they view more favorably. Second, the public must prefer parties that are more internally unified. Even if one allows that parties are extended brands where each candidate represents a different product line with a unique combination of attributes, the party label is only useful as a device that conveys meaning if members of the party are seen as having something in common. If these conditions are not satisfied, then there is little 324 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18(3) reason for politicians within parties to unite around a common agenda to win votes by branding their party. The purpose of this article is to develop a formal representation of how voters develop images about the two parties and their level of uncertainty about those images that provides a framework for understanding the conditions for successful branding. To accomplish this task, the article generalizes the Bayesian models of voter learning introduced by Achen (1992 Achen ( , 2002 , Bartels (2002) , Gerber and Green (1998; see also Green et al., 2002) , and others. The key innovations in the current article are that learning is described as occurring about party ideology and that voters are allowed to be uncertain both about the average partisan's ideology as well as the variance in a party's ideology. As a result, it is possible to model both the party's image and their uncertainty about that image -which correspond to the level of agreement with the two defining conditions of a brand -as a consequence of the actions of political elites. The value of generalizing the earlier work in this way is that if voters are assumed to evaluate parties with quadratic expected utility functions (i.e., they are proximity loving and risk averse), then it is possible to explain how elites could parley party unity into electoral gains.
The Voter Learning Model
To understand how citizen behavior may be shaped by party elites, it is useful to begin with a model that describes how citizens see the world and react to new information. In this article, voter learning is represented by a stylized Bayesian updating model in which voters make inferences about party ideologies based on their political experiences. To be clear, this approach is not adopted because people truly are strict Bayesians in the sense described below. The Bayesian framework is used because it captures a lot of the intuition about the way that people seem to learn, and its rigor provides a valuable bridge between behavioral models of the electorate and formal models commonly used to describe elite behavior. For this reason, formal learning models have become common in the study of party identification, and the Bayesian approach adopted here situates this article within this important body of scholarship (Achen, 1992 (Achen, , 2002 Gerber and Green, 1998; Green et al., 2002) .
It is illustrative to introduce the current model, by contrasting four of its main assumptions with those made in earlier work. One assumption in the models developed by Achen (1992 Achen ( , 2002 and Gerber and Green (1998; see also Green et al., 2002) is that voters update beliefs about a single quantity characterized as net party benefits. Achen (1992) justifies this approach, arguing that in a two-party system, the net difference in the expected performance of the two parties is all that voters need to determine their partisan attachments. An observation (or piece of data) that voters use to update beliefs in Achen and Gerber and Green's learning models is evaluations of the relative performance of Democrats and Republicans over the course of a single election cycle (or some other fixed time interval).
In this article, it is instead assumed that voters update their beliefs about the distributions of both the Democratic and Republican ideologies separately. On the one hand, this assumption is less general than the earlier accounts because it is explicitly about ideology rather than net benefits more generally. This greater specificity is useful in linking the current literature on party in government that focuses on ideology (or some other similar dimension of evaluation) with studies of voter behavior. On the other hand, the model developed here is more general because it treats evaluations of the two parties as distinct quantities. This more general treatment is necessary because it is possible that one party could be highly unified around a common platform, while the other party is internally fractured. This possible asymmetry could have implications for party preferences -if Democrats and Republicans have the same expected behavior, then the brand metaphor suggests that voters prefer the more certain choice. An observation that contributes to voter learning is a message received from an individual candidate who belongs to a party about his or her ideology. Beliefs about the two parties are therefore based on inferences drawn from the set of candidate-specific observations gathered over their lifetimes. Allowing individual politicians to influence party images in this way is crucial to apply the brand logic to politics. Citizens who observe a party that is either internally divided within a single election cycle or a party that gyrates from the political left to right from one cycle to the next will not receive the sort of consistent party experiences necessary to cast a vote solely in accord with a party's brand name.
A second assumption in the models by Achen (1992 Achen ( , 2002 and Gerber and Green (1998; see also Green et al., 2002) is that the mean of the distribution of party realizations is 'unknown' to the voter, but the variance in the distribution is 'known'. The rationale offered is that 'only the true mean benefit is of interest to the voter. She wishes to forecast future benefits so that she can vote intelligently . . . Hence to predict benefits to come, she can do no better than to forecast the mean' (Achen, 1992: 199) . This conclusion seems a bit peculiar, however, given that it follows almost by definition that the rational prospective decision maker described by Achen is an expected utility maximizer, and expected utility maximizers without risk neutral preferences would factor uncertainty into their decisions. Moreover, it seems inconsistent to assume that voters must infer the location of the mean of the distribution based on political experience, but know a priori the variance in the distribution of a party's ideological messages. In their defense, uncertainty in the 326 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18(3) earlier models was about the distribution of net party benefits, so that changes in the variance would not help or hurt either party, so modeling the variance would have needlessly complicated matters. The current study relaxes the assumption that voters know the variance in the distribution of party ideologies in order to model how changes in elite behavior influence voter uncertainty, and therefore their expected utilities toward the two parties.
A third, more controversial, assumption by Achen (1992) is that 'the [net party] benefits vary independently from one term of office to the next around a central tendency. Thus, the parties may oscillate left or right by chance, but they do not drift steadily in any one direction ' (p. 199) . Voter learning therefore proceeds as if the distribution of party realizations was constant over time so that people do not need to worry about the mean (or variance) shifting. In contrast, Gerber and Green (1998; see also Green et al., 2002 ) relax Achen's assumption that the distribution of party realizations was stable. They argue that 'since the parties do not remain fixed over time, however, the amount of useful knowledge contained in past observations diminishes as time passes ' (p. 807) .
This article adopts Achen's assumption that the distribution of party realizations is constant over time, or more accurately, that voters observe the parties and update their beliefs as if the distribution of party ideologies is constant. In part, the choice is made because Gerber and Green's (1998) evidence is not sufficiently compelling to reject the simpler model. This is because the survey instruments that they use to test the learning model are not an accurate measurement of the theoretical concept implied by this article (and presumably by Achen). The present model assumes that party identification should not be context specific. Gerber and Green's survey questions, however, are clearly conditioned on current events. Thus, one of the questions they use to assess prospective evaluations asks: 'Looking ahead for the next few years, which political party do you think will do a better job of keeping the country prosperous -the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?' (Gerber and Green, 1998: 799) . Answers to questions like this are not statements about party preference in general, but are conditional on things like which party is currently in power and its current performance of government. For example, during the 1990s, many Republicans may have stated that the Democrats would be better for the economy over the next few years' boom because they thought Clinton would continue to be effective in office, but that does not that mean that they believed that Democrats, in general, would be better for the economy.
Another justification for this assumption is that it seems unrealistic to assume that people rapidly abandon beliefs grounded in a lifetime of prior experience simply because of a few contrary experiences. It is more likely that when confronted with information inconsistent with prior beliefs, voters GRYNAVISKI: A BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL 327 will become more uncertain, but they will wait for evidence to accumulate before they substantially change their beliefs about the parties' expected behavior. As will be shown, the Bayesian learning model with unknown mean and variance implies this relationship. A fourth assumption adopted by Achen is that party identification is the expected value from having one party in control of government rather than another. The benefit of Achen's interpretation of party identification is that it comports nicely with Key's (1952 Key's ( , 1966 notion that party identification is a 'standing decision' based on previous experiences with the two parties. That is, people are said to identify with the party whose candidates they expect to vote for in a majority of elections, but that there may be circumstances where someone votes for the other party's candidates based on the characteristics of the individual office seekers. Thus, party identification is a distinct concept from vote choice or the preference for the leaders of one party rather than another. Green and his colleagues (2002), on the other hand, believe that party identification is grounded in group identities and has little basis in evaluations of Democratic and Republican performance in government. In fact, Green et al.'s disagreement with rational choice treatments of party identification seems to be the motivation for their argument that learning does not slow over the life-cycle. Whether or not people discount the past proves important because party ID is basically stable over the life-cycle so that it could only be said to be based on a rational calculation of expected party performance if it is the case that learning slows as people age. To the extent that Gerber and Green's evidence against Achen's learning model is non-diagnostic, there is little reason to conclude that the rational choice interpretation is necessarily flawed, especially given that theories of party identification grounded in social group identities struggle mightily to explain political realignments such as that which occurred among many Southern whites over the last half-century, Catholics in the 1970s, and African-Americans in the 1960s (e.g., Grynaviski and Harris-Lacewell, 2005) .
This article adopts Achen's assumption that party identification is a rational choice, but argues that party identification is a function of people's expected utility from Democratic or Republican candidates rather than their expected value. The difference between these two interpretations is subtle but important. The expected utility model advanced in this article suggests that people care about both ideological proximity and the level of uncertainty regarding their choices, not just proximity. If people see that party members are close to them ideologically on average, but that the party is highly conflicted so that there are a large number of liberal and conservative party members, then voters would have little confidence in the quality of their choice based solely on the party's brand name. Thus, people would be reluctant to make a standing decision to vote for one party if there is a high probability that another party's candidates would be the better choice.
328
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18(3)
A Formal Description of Voter Learning
Stated in formal terms, the Bayesian learning model is based on a few simple definitions and assumptions. First, assume that an individual's belief about a party's ideology (which is represented by points along the real line) is determined by their observations of the party over time. Let y j denote the j th message associated with a political party and j 2 f1; . . . ; ng. Second, assume that each message is a random draw from a distribution of party messages with unknown mean and unknown variance 2 . For simplicity the normal distribution is used. Thus, y j $ iid Nð;
2 Þ for all j. Third, assume that an individual's prior belief about the mean and variance in the party's ideology is represented by a normal-inverse-chi-squared distribution (N À À 2 ). The normal-inverse-chi-squared distribution is convenient because it is the conjugate prior distribution for and 2 if the data are normally distributed.
1 Thus, prior beliefs about and 2 are given by: Gelman et al., 1995) . The interpretation of the prior parameters 0 ; k 0 ; v 0 ; 2 0 is easiest if one decomposes the joint distribution of and 2 into pð;
Þ. So 0 represents the prior beliefs about the party's average ideology and 2 =k 0 the amount of prior uncertainty around that location. Whereas 2 =k 0 indicates the prior uncertainty about the mean, 2 provides information about uncertainty in y j . The prior information about 2 is given by 2 0 and v 0 , which denote, respectively, the prior scale and degrees of freedom such that the expected prior uncertainty about the party's location is: E½ 2 0 ¼ 2 0 ½v 0 =ðv 0 À 2Þ. Overall, this probability model is flexible enough that it could provide a reasonable approximation for most individuals' prior beliefs. The main restriction is that beliefs must be unimodal and symmetric about .
Fourth, assume that people obey the standard axioms of probability theory including Bayes's Rule. Individuals observe y j -the individual messages about the party -and use this additional data to update their beliefs about and 2 . The assumptions are simply a statement that individuals pursue a Bayesian updating process and provide the distributional assumptions of the model. Because of the nature of the Bayesian updating process and the way that data are combined, it is straightforward to identify an individual's beliefs about a party's ideology following a set of political observations. GRYNAVISKI: A BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL 329 1. A conjugate prior distribution for a given likelihood function satisfies the condition that the posterior distribution is from the same distributional family as the prior. PrOPOSITION 1. Following n observations, the joint posterior distribution of and 2 is:
The marginal posterior distribution of is: Gelman et al., 1995: 72- 3)
The key elements of the Proposition for present purposes are E n ½ and E n ½ 2 , which are the expected values for the average party message and the variance in those messages. The interpretation and implications of these two expressions will be considered in turn.
Implications of Bayesian Learning about the Mean
The result for the average party message, E n ½, is almost identical to that derived by Achen (1992) , and readers interested in a more detailed description of the result should consult this work. Briefly, the expression for E n ½ states that beliefs about a party's ideology will be based on a weighted average of prior beliefs 0 and the sample mean y y n of the observed candidate messages, where the weights are given respectively by the amount of prior information k 0 and the number of new messages n. As a result, when confronted with information contrary to their prior beliefs, a person will update their view of the party's ideology to make their posterior beliefs more consistent with the new data. The rate of change depends on the volume of information received: beliefs will change more, the greater the amount of information collected during an election cycle that contradicts prior beliefs. Similarly, beliefs will change more the weaker someone's Key, 1966; Page, 1978; Carmines and Stimson, 1989) shows that public perceptions of party differences have reacted to changes in the magnitude of inter-party conflict and that these effects are mediated by political expertise. Also notable is that the 'resistance' of knowledgeable individuals to new information and the 'receptiveness' to new information of politically engaged individuals derived from the Bayesian learning model are key features of Zaller's (1992) RAS model of attitude change, which generates similar predictions about the non-linear impact of new information on political beliefs. While one might disagree about the precise psychological process, it seems difficult to argue that the simple Bayesian learning model is an unreasonable representation of vote learning. Given that there is ample evidence for the proposition in the literature, to save space another test of this relationship will not be reported.
There is one observation, though, that appears to run contrary to the intuitions of the Bayesian learning model. It is well-documented that Democrats and Republicans have different beliefs about objects in their political environment (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Zaller, 1992) even though two groups of Bayesian learners exposed to the same set of information should inexorably come to see the world in the same way (Bartels, 2002) . Gerber and Green (1999) argue that this can be easily explained because Democrats and Republicans have different priors, and therefore different posteriors; however, Bartels (2002) proves formally that in a Bayesian framework beliefs should converge to the same point regardless of prior beliefs. More convincingly, Gerber and Green (1999) contend that Democrats and Republicans have different preferences, so their evaluations of the parties would be different even if they were exposed to the same information. For most examples of interparty differences in opinion, this explanation makes sense; however, Bartels (2002) finds that differences persist on seemingly objective questions. For example, he shows that Democrats were less likely to acknowledge dramatic improvements in the unemployment and inflation rate under the eight years of the Reagan administration (pp. 135-6). The weakness of Bartels's argument is that the questions he uses are implicitly a referendum on Reagan's performance in office (i.e., it is an evaluation question), and Democrats may simply not have given Reagan credit. The key piece of evidence for this is provided by pure independents, who should behave like Republicans if Democrats were screening out favorable information about Reagan. Yet, the responses of pure independents were indistinguishable from those of Democrats, suggesting that there was more than a 'perceptual screen' of partisanship at work (p. 135). Nevertheless, it probably is true that Democrats and Republicans have different sources of information and have different assessments about the credulity of the information that they receive, but this is not fatal to the Bayesian updating as a representation of the learning process -one need only extend the model to account for information search, though this is beyond the current article's ambitions.
Implications of Bayesian Learning about the Variance
A more novel set of implications is provided by Proposition 1 for someone's beliefs about the variance of the distribution of ideological messages about the party represented by the expression E n ½ 2 . In contrast to previous Bayesian learning models which unrealistically predict that more evidence decreases the variance in beliefs about a party's expected behavior, Proposition 1 states that individuals receiving contradictory information will become more uncertain. One source of this contradictory information comes in the form of conflicting messages about the party within a single period measured by s 2 n : high levels of intra-party ideological conflict within an electoral cycle increase uncertainty, while low levels of intra-party conflict decrease uncertainty. Another source of contradictory information occurs when new information conflicts with prior beliefs, represented formally by the expression ð y y n À 0 Þ 2 . Consequently, if parties are consistent in their messages over time, then new information confirms prior beliefs and decreases uncertainty, but if parties are erratic and constantly transform their platforms, then new information may increase uncertainty so that the party label conveys no useful information that could inform vote choice.
It is also noteworthy that the accumulation of wisdom over the life-cycle represented by strengthening prior beliefs does not unambiguously decrease the rate of learning about uncertainty. On the one hand, stronger prior beliefs about the variance in the distribution of party ideologies (denoted v 0 ) will decrease responsiveness to new information, similar to the effect of stronger priors on the mean. On the other hand, stronger prior beliefs about a party's mean location denoted k 0 increase the responsiveness of uncertainty about the party's ideology to new information inconsistent with prior beliefs. This finding is somewhat puzzling given that Bayesian learning generally predicts that stronger priors retard belief change. The explanation for this counterintuitive result is that k 0 and n (the number of new messages) provide measures of how much evidence exists for disagreement between the prior beliefs about the party's image. The greater the evidence of inconsistency, the more uncertain someone becomes.
Unfortunately, direct measures of individuals' uncertainty about the ideological positions of the Democratic and Republican parties are not available, Bartels (1986) counts the frequency of non-responses to candidate issue placement questions as a measure of voter uncertainty. Zaller (1992) uses the accuracy of respondent placements of candidates and parties on issue scales as a measure of political information which could serve as a proxy for uncertainty. Grynaviski (2005) uses the number of responses to open-ended party like-dislike questions as a measure of certainty about Democratic and Republican issue positions. Each of these indirect measures is suspect as a measure of the perceived variance in the distribution of candidates within a party, but could be interpreted as a behavioral manifestation of the concept of interest. For present purposes, it should suffice to offer testable implications of the theory and then exploit changes in the magnitude of ideological conflict within the two parties over time as a sort of natural experiment to determine whether observed behavior is consistent with the model.
Partisan Choice
The model of partisan choice is premised on the assumptions that voters have standard quadratic expected utility functions and that they favor the party for which they have the greatest expected utility. Let v i represent a voter's ideal point along a real line representing a point along an ideological continuum and let y D and y R denote, respectively, future draws from the distribution of Democratic and Republican ideologies. Let D and R denote the expected value of these draws from the posterior predictive distributions of the learning model for the two parties and let D2 and R2 denote the variances of these distributions. Thus, voter i's expected utilities for Democrats and Republicans are described by the following pair of expressions:
(Hinich and Munger, 1997).
These expressions can be decomposed into two parts which roughly correspond in a consumer choice problem to a person's tastes and the risk GRYNAVISKI: A BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL 333 premium that they are willing to pay. The first part describes how favorably voter i views the substantive content of the party label. Specifically, the greater the distance between the individual's ideal point and where they believe the party stands ideologically, the less the actor's utility for the party. The second part of the expected utility function is related to the uncertainty about the party's image: the smaller the variance in the party's spatial positions, the more confident the individual is in his or her assessment of the party's ideology, and the greater utility for the party. It is assumed that the voter identifies with the party for which he or she has the highest expected utility. Accordingly, a person is said to be a Democrat if: EU½ y D > EU½y R ; he or she is a Republican if: EU½ y D < EU½ y R ; otherwise, he or she is an Independent. One additional and seemingly reasonable assumption that will be exploited later in the article is that the strength of partisan attachments will be an increasing function of their expected utility for their most preferred party.
Implications of Bayesian Learning for Party Choice
When the intuitions of Bayesian learning are applied to the formal model of party identification, a series of observable implications of the theory can be identified that seem to comport with voter behavior. To generate these implications it is necessary to substitute the expressions for E n ½ and E n ½ 2 into the expected utility calculations for the two parties for and 2 .
2 It follows that the factors which affect voters' beliefs about the mean and variance in the distribution of party ideologies will similarly influence their expected utilities toward the two parties. Pursuing this tact, a number of hypotheses can be derived from the theory (beyond banal observations like conservatives tend to be Republicans), which will be considered in turn.
The first hypothesis (also derived by Achen, 1992) is that the selection of Democratic or Republican identifications may fluctuate early in life, but will stabilize as people age and accumulate greater information. The postulated mechanism is that expectations about the party's expected behavior E n ½ fluctuate early in the life-cycle, but stabilize as the individual gains wisdom -as beliefs stabilize, so will partisanship. Considerable support for this point already exists in the literature. Jennings and Markus (1984) examine data from a panel study of parents and children that spanned the period 334 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (3) 2. Technically, the variance of the posterior predictive distribution for y should include uncertainty about both and y. However, given a sufficiently large number of partisan images, uncertainty about will be very small, as in Achen's (1992) results, so E n ½ 2 should provide a satisfactory approximation. Further, the expression for uncertainty about shows that it is an increasing function of the sample variance, just as in the expression for uncertainty about y. Thus, the direction of the effects in comparative static analysis should remain unchanged. from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s. They report: 'the results offer a strong endorsement of a learning model based on experiential history . . . the younger cohort scored a large gain in partisan stability during the 1973-1982 span. At the same time, the older cohort registered a very modest gain' (p. 1004).
While panel studies provide compelling evidence of growing stability within individuals, one might argue that this was isolated to one generation and not part of a more general phenomenon. Compelling counterevidence to this point is provided by Miller and Shanks (1996) who use ANES data to track the behavior of cohorts from those first eligible to vote for president in 1896 through those first eligible to vote in 1992. They conclude: 'Changes in social conditions and political context are more likely to produce changes in party identification among the young -or the newly identified -than among the old' (p. 184). Further support is provided by Bartels (2001) who analyzes the ANES cohort data by adopting a flexible functional form able to estimate both age and period effects. While expressing considerable skepticism that simple Bayesian learning describes the mechanism for change, he still concludes:
My estimates of the age-specific weights characterizing various points in the life-span are generally consistent (at least between the ages of 15 and 60) with a simple Bayesian model in which an individual's opinion at any give time is a simple average or 'running tally' of past political experiences. I find no support for the hypothesis that more recent events receive disproportional weight, and only slight (and statistically uncertain) support for the notion that events experienced during a crucial period encompassing late adolescence and early adulthood have more powerful effects than those experienced later in life.
The growing stability of partisan attachments over the life-cycle seems a robust finding.
The second hypothesis is that individuals who become politically aware during periods when the parties are internally divided will enter adulthood with weaker partisan identifications than those socialized during periods of more unified parties. The postulated mechanism has two steps. The first step is that the strength of partisan attachments is a decreasing function of uncertainty about the parties' expected behavior because this greater uncertainty decreases expected utilities toward the most preferred party. The second step is that beliefs about the variances in the distributions of Democratic and Republican ideologies are based on observations of the level of intra-party conflict. To the extent that the observed level of conflict is correlated with the amount of conflict that actually exists within the parties, uncertainty and the strength of their partisan attachments will wax and wane with party unity at the elite level. This effect should be easiest to observe among young people because the only information that they possess about the parties is derived from recent events, and will not be substantially affected by previous experiences with the parties.
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To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to identify periods when the parties have been more or less unified and then examine whether the behavior of voters just entering the political system varies in the manner predicted by the theory. Fortunately, the decline and resurgence in levels of party unity within the Democratic and Republican parties over the last several generations provides an excellent natural experiment to test this hypothesis. While a number of measures could illustrate this dynamic, in this article changes in the standard deviation in Democratic and Republican House members' ideological locations first dimension DW-Nominate coordinates (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) are used because the Nominate scores are based on a set of assumptions concerning voting behavior that comport most closely with the spatial model of politics employed in this study. Figure 1 plots the observed levels of ideological conflict within the Democratic and Republican caucuses from the start of the New Deal party alignment in 1931. It shows that there was a general upward trend in the level of ideological conflict within both the Democratic and Republican parties from the 79th Congress (which entered office in 1945) through the 92nd Congress (which left office in 1973). The trend then reversed itself, with a gradual increase in party unity within both caucuses through the mid-1990s. Over the most recent Congress, however, both parties may be showing the first 336 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18(3) Figure 1 . Intra-party Conflict in the United States House of Representatives, 1931 Representatives, -2002 signs of growing ideological divisions, though it is too soon to tell whether it is a meaningful trend. If intra-party conflict creates uncertainty about party behavior, and this uncertainty is related to the strength of party attachments, then one would expect to find a decline in the number of strong identifiers and an increase in the number of pure independents from the 1950s through the 1970s, and that these trends would reverse from the 1970s through the 1990s. Support for this argument is provided in Table 1 , which provides cross-tabs of the proportion of respondents to the ANES younger than 30 years old that identified themselves as strong partisans, as weak partisans/leaning independents, or as pure independents by decade. The table shows that the number of pure independents more than doubled from 8% in the 1950s to almost 20% in the 1970s while the number of strong partisans fell by more than half during this period from 34% in the 1950s to just 16% in the 1970s.
3 While the evidence for the weakening of partisan attachments among young voters during the middle part of the 20th century is convincing, it would be even more compelling if this trend reversed itself, with partisan attachments growing among younger voters in response to increasing levels of party unity. Table 1 demonstrates that this reversal did take place: the strength of partisan attachments was approximately 25% stronger in the 1990s than in the 1970s, with the number of pure independents falling to 14% of young people and the number of strong partisans rising to 21%.
One contrary piece of evidence is that partisan identifications were stronger among young people in the 1950s than in the 1990s, while levels of party unity during these two decades were roughly equivalent. One possible explanation for this pattern is that voters during these two periods entered the political system with different sets of prior beliefs: young adults in the 1950s may have been taught that party labels were meaningful heuristics by parents who had lived through the period of highly unified parties during the 1930s (see Figure 1) , while young adults in the 1990s may have been taught that party labels were not meaningful heuristics by parents who had endured the period of highly fractured parties during the 1970s. Alternatively, the national parties may have ideologies that are further from the typical voter today than they were a half-century ago. Perhaps this can be seen most clearly in behavior about the Republican Party which seems to have moved sharply toward a more conservative set of policies which seem to have alienated many voters, especially in the northeastern United States. The argument developed in this article suggests that the Republican strategy may have been successful because the party was able GRYNAVISKI: A BAYESIAN LEARNING MODEL 337
3. The weakness of partisanship among young voters during the 1970s relatively to that observed during the 1950s is well-documented (e.g., Miller and Shanks, 1996) . to tradeoff spatial proximity to voters for greater certainty about the party's behavior. To the extent that the party is still able to gain the support of a majority of voters in half of America's congressional districts, this strategy could prove to be very effective in the electoral arena, even if the party did not have strong support nationally. The third hypothesis is that the strength of party identification could increase or decrease as people age. This claim stands in contrast to Campbell et al.'s (1960: 161-5 ) 'life-cycle' argument that the strength of partisanship grows with age and Abramson's (1976: 472-5 ) 'generational' argument that party attachments develop during an early socialization period and persist over time. The logic underlying the hypothesis developed here is that, on the one hand, party identification will grow stronger if new observations about the party have lower variance than prior beliefs so that voter certainty grows over time. On the other hand, party identification may weaken if people become more uncertain. Uncertainty-inducing information flows could simply be the result of increases in observed levels of intra-party conflict over time, or new data could contradict prior beliefs about a party's expected behavior in office.
Evidence supportive of the hypothesis that the strength of partisan attachments varies over time has been provided by earlier studies employing panel and cohort data. For example, Jennings and Niemi (1981) find in their panel study tracking the development of youths into adulthood that the strength of partisanship among young people actually declined as people entered their 20s. Notably, this study compared the behavior of respondents from 1965 through 1973 which was the nadir in levels of party unity, so that the weakening of party identification is anticipated by the theory. Similarly, Abramson (1976) conducts a cohort analysis to examine changes in the strength of party identification over the life-cycle. He finds that a weakening in the strength of party attachments occurred among all cohorts during the 1960s which is inconsistent with a strict generational argument. Miller and Shanks (1996: 153-9) demonstrate through the analysis of cohort data in the ANES that the strength of party identification can increase over the life-cycle as well as decline. They report that among all cohorts of voters who entered the political system after World War II, the strength of partisan attachments increased from the mid-1970s through the early 1990s. Given the rising levels of party unity during this period, this strengthening of partisan attachments is anticipated by the model, providing further evidence for an information-driven account of partisanship.
The fourth hypothesis is that aggregate partisanship will be stronger during periods with high levels of intra-party unity and weaker during periods with lower levels of party unity, especially if lower levels of party unity are associated with changes in the message that the party delivers to the public. The hypothesis implies that the strength of all voters' attachments may tend to move in the same direction regardless of age, though the source of the change will be different across generations. The learning model suggests that the most important factor influencing the uncertainty of young people will be the level of intra-party conflict, while older voters will be particularly sensitive to new information that conflicts with prior beliefs about the parties' expected behavior in office. During the period considered most closely in this article dating from the 1950s through the 1990s, it seems that the factors that would create uncertainty across generations were mutually reinforcing, when politics within the Democratic Party becoming particularly conflicted when the national party moved to the left while a staunch group of conservative Southerners maintained their association with the party.
If the hypothesis is correct, then the decline in party unity illustrated in Figure 1 from the 1950s through the early1970s, should correspond to declining partisan attachments in the electorate; conversely, from the early 1970s through today, increasing intra-party unity should correspond to strengthening partisan attachments in the electorate. To examine this hypothesis, Table 2 reports by decade the proportion of respondents to the ANES who identify themselves as strong partisan identifiers, a weak identifier or independent leaner, or as a pure independent. As expected, the Table reveals that during 1960s and 1970s, the proportion of respondents who considered themselves strong party identifiers declined from its peak levels in the 1950s. Similarly, the proportion of respondents who considered themselves pure independents almost doubled from its low in the 1950s to its high in the 1970s. Then, as party unity began to grow, the trends in the strength of partisan identification also reversed, with growing numbers of strong partisan identifiers and declining numbers of pure independents through the 1980s and 1990s. Bartels (2000) provides a more fine-grained measure of partisan attachments that reveals changes in the strength of partisan commitments even within categories of partisanship, providing further support for the theory. He reports that in a series of probit models predicting party-line votes in presidential elections that the coefficients for the effect of 'strong' and 'weak' partisans and 'independent' leaners all declined together with the strength of the attachments themselves from the early 1950s through the mid-1970s, but that the effect of all three categories of partisan attachments rebounded during the 1980s and 1990s (p. 40). Moreover, these changes were not a regional phenomenon. Bartels writes: the steady and substantial increases in partisan voting over the past quarter-century . . . are by no means confined to the South . . . The absolute level of partisan voting in the 1964 and 1972 elections is only slightly lower among southern whites than among nonsouthern whites, and the substantial increase in partisan voting since 1972 appears clearly (indeed, nearly monotonically) in both subgroups. (p. 41)
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JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18(3) distinctions between the two parties. Hetherington (2001) makes this arguments most forcefully: 'As people come to realize that Democrats and Republicans will pursue substantially different courses, attachment to one side or the other becomes more consequential, and party image becomes more salient' (p. 627). The strength of this argument is that it seems likely that as differences between the two parties grow, that people should have stronger opinions about which party wins the election, since the winner makes policy. It does not necessarily follow, however, that partisan attachments will necessarily become stronger as parties pull apart -taken to its logical conclusion, this would mean that if parties adopted infinitely extreme positions to present the starkest possible differences, then voters would have the strongest possible partisan attachments. 6 I believe that if a voter sees a party as too extreme, even if that party were preferred to the other options, she would feel alienated from both parties and identify with neither.
The take home point of this article is that the resurgence in Americans' partisan attachments may be a consequence of both greater levels of agreement within the parties as well as clearer inter-party differences. To the extent that inter-party unity and intra-party agreement are typically correlated with one another, it will be difficult to tease out whether one effect dominates the other. However, it is possible to imagine situations where this relationship does not hold and a consideration of these hypothetical settings provides useful insight. For example, there could be large differences between the average Republican and average Democratic politician during a period when there is also a large overlap in the distribution of party elite ideologies. In that situation, I would expect partisan attachments to be weak because of a lack of certainty about what an arbitrarily chosen candidate within a given party stood for. Similarly, there could be small differences between the average Democrat and Republican ideologically, but have almost no overlap between the ideologies of the two parties. In that case, I would expect partisan attachments to be strong because voters would be able to easily identify which camp they belonged to, and because there would be little ground for compromise between the parties, inter-party conflict would probably be quite shrill. While not everyone will agree with these claims, the distinction between the scope of inter-party conflict and the level of intra-party agreement may prove to be useful in identifying the relationship between voters and parties and the incentives that politicians face to develop clear partisan reputations.
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JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (3) 6. Tellingly, Hetherington never uses strength of party identification as a dependent variable in the analyses he reports. When his pooled cross-section models of party resurgence are estimated with the strength of party identification as the dependent variable, party elite polarization is not a significant predictor despite 10,000 plus cases. These results are available upon request.
has a shot at majority control of government, it may be willing to accept that it would be uncompetitive in certain regions.
The model also cannot rule out the possibility that national parties will be ideological smorgasbords, where candidates within the party simply cater to district tastes. This strategy would be consistent with the selfish incentives of each politician looking out for his or her own electoral interests. Nevertheless, it is possible that a unified party could be competitive nationally against this sort of catchall organization because the unified party's candidates would be considered more reliable liberals or conservatives and therefore would have a reputational advantage in districts with ideologies similar to that of their party. Perhaps even more importantly, the problem with a true catch-all party is that if it gains control of the national legislature, the party will be ineffectual as an agent of governance because its members would be completely at odds over policy. To the extent that majority party leaders prefer to enter office with a team of like-minded ideologues in order to control the policy agenda, there are extra-electoral incentives for parties to adopt a low-variance strategy.
Further work is needed to determine the circumstances of how individual candidates are able to signal similarities with and differences from their copartisans and the incentives this creates for political activity. However, wouldn't it be something if the electorate provided incentives for parties to act 'responsibly' in the sense advocated by early party theorists, and this responsibility improved the public's ability to differentiate between rival candidates for office and make informed choices?
